Re: 1571/1581 Sources: Macro WDTEST inserting NOP before reading WD177x status register / writing command register

From: Rainer Buchty <rainer_at_buchty.net>
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 23:07:25 +0100 (CET)
Message-ID: <952f578c-753-8d69-c3a-f3abcebce73_at_buchty.net>
On Wed, 16 Mar 2022, smf wrote:

> There are lots of things that contributed, but the xor patent stopped
> them being able to import any products into the US.

How so? I have a hard time seeing how the so-called XOR patent (USPTO 
#4,197,590) would've particularly affected Commodore in 1993, more so as 
it was already filed in 1976 and originally assigned in 1981 before 
being reassigned in 1989 and 1993.

If it were such an issue, it would've been one from the very beginnings 
-- and to pretty much all video-chip, console and computer manufacturers 
(if interpreted broadly) or at least any software-controlled framebuffer 
solution.

> Sony would have steam rollered commodore too, but I was just pointing 
> out what did kill commodore.

Let's face it: What killed Commodore was the inability to adjust to the 
ever-increasing pace in the computer market. IOW, sheer and utter 
management failure. Unfortunately on many ends and for years.

They were simply spoiled by the C64's success. Already then they did not 
have a clear vision of the future. Maybe Tramiel had before his leave, 
though also he was already somewhat neglecting the market development.

On the office side of things, they did the CBM-II architecture where 
CP/M was the de-facto standard there, quickly losing ground to the 
PC/MS-DOS combination. Overlapping to that, they did the C900 
series.

After he left, things turned to the worse.

They could've marketed the C128 as a true and compatible C64 successor, 
instead they placed it against the PC and Apple (who doesn't remember 
the cringy "bad news" ads). They even created potential competitors to 
the C64/C128 market, i.e. the TED machines.

So Commodore was already running into a dead end back then and it was 
sheer luck that they managed to secure the Amiga company and platform.

Unfortunately, they then quickly failed at proper marketing -- and even 
more so at keeping the platform competitive, despite the fact that the 
platform was originally designed expandable both on HW and SW level.

And while the Amiga was undoubtedly stunning when it was released in 
1984/5, starting around 1987/88 it quickly lost its grounds on all ends, 
computation speed, graphics, and sound.

By the time ECS was introduced, PC graphics were already superior in 
terms of resolution, frame rate, color palette and number of 
simultaneously displayable colors. Similarly, the Amiga's sound 
capabilities were less than overwhelming in 1990 where the PC had 
evolved from beeper to Adlib, to SoundBlaster (or even "studio-level" 
solutions like Roland's LAPC1). Same old 4-channel / 8-bit, even with 
now higher playback rates, didn't cut it anymore.

Not to mention the necessity for half-speed drives in order to support 
HD disks or a specialized monitor with built-in framebuffer to achieve 
truly modern resolutions at modern horizontal rates (though not really 
modern overall frame rates).

The dream machine the Amiga was 1985 hence quickly lost to the 
despicable, but ever so quickly evolving PC platform.

If AGA came years earlier, things might have looked differently, but as 
Commodore always neglected the open aspect of their architecture by 
focusing on more or less monolithic machines that cemented a certain 
technology level (A500, A600, A1200) this would only have delayed their 
final fate, and probably not for long either.

They just couldn't keep up with the speed of the PC market that was 
driven by a large number of manufactures, independently focusing on 
mainboards, graphics cards, and sound cards. (As a side-effect of the 
fast and dynamic PC market, Intel beat Motorola in development speed 
with Motorola ultimately losing the race.)

Even worse: Commodore never enforced OS-conforming programming like 
Apple did (which in the end allowed them to change the entire hardware 
and software infrastructure) or like it was mandatory on the PC platform 
(BIOS and VESA BIOS calls). Instead, it wasn't that uncommon that 
software exploded with every larger Kickstart update like 1.2 to 1.3 or 
1.3 to 2.0 or didn't like to play well with other software for reasons 
of directly banging the hardware or using "shortcuts" to and within 
system calls; not to mention issues when introducing CPUs that accessed 
the full 32 bits of address range rather than just 24 bits.

And instead of addressing these issues, Commodore rather wasted their 
energy coughing up a sort-of-but-not-compatible C64 successor that -- if 
actively marketed -- would've cannibalized the low-end Amiga market.

It certainly wasn't #4,197,590 that killed Commodore, and also not that 
patent being re-assigned to some patent troll in 1993.

I loved the C64. I loved the Amiga. I still do for the wonderful time I 
had with those machines and for the incredible things that are still 
done with them.

But seeing and listening to Second Reality back in 1993 showed me the 
bitter truth: the good old times were over -- and the originally 
shittiest and most uninspired computing platform had finally won.

That was the final nail into Commodore's coffin.

Not a patent.

Rainer
Received on 2022-03-17 00:00:03

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